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Taking Down a Dictator: How to Legally 
Remove a Tyrant From Office 
 
October 28, 2017 
by Susan Imerman 
What do Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Moammar Qaddafi of Libya, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe 
all have in common? They are all dictators still in power causing mass terror and destruction to 
their suffering nations. International law prohibits genocide and acts of cruelty which tyrants 
regularly invoke against their citizens. Yet, despite the clear violations of international law, 
removing abusive leaders from power, or even orchestrating an arrest, poses a difficult task for the 
international legal community. Although international law forbids using force to intervene with 
other state actors, exceptions exist for instances of necessary humanitarian intervention. 
The 1948 UN Genocide Convention (Convention)was the first treaty to outline when a state may 
use force against a violent state-actor. Established in the aftermath of WWII, the 
Convention defined genocide as the “intentional killing, destruction, or extermination of groups or 
members of a group” and declared that member states “have a duty to not let genocide go 
unpunished.” The Convention dictates that states may intervene only by supplying peaceful 
humanitarian aid to victims, through an invitation from the host nation, or with the authorization 
of The UN Security Council (UNSC). Article Two of the UN Charter precludes states from 
sending in armed forces or supplying weapons or other forms of war materials by defining these 
acts as forms of unlawful aggression. 
Despite the stringent restrictions and international debate, the UNSC authorized the use of force 
to prevent human rights abuse numerous times since its creation. In 1994, the UNSC worked 
alongside French forces to enact a large-scale military operation in response to the  genocide in 
Rwanda. During the Korean War in 1950, the UNSC, unable to authorize intervention due a 
member state’s veto, transferred its power over to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGA 
then stepped in to “recommend” collective action from South Korea and the US against North 
Korean aggressors. In the decades following the Korean War, Western nations frustrated by the 
slow-moving UNSC continued using the UNGA as a tool to circumvent the UNSC’s authority and 
justify acts of aggressive humanitarian intervention. The shift in power caused an expansion 
of Article 2, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which stipulates instances of permitted forceful 
humanitarian invention. 
Years after the 1948 Geneva Convention, the United States Congress passed The Genocide 
Accountability Act of 2007 (GAA). The Act expanded the lawful prosecution of genocide and 
authorized US officials to apprehend any offender who “brought into, or found in the United 
States,” even if the violating conduct occurred outside of US territory. The GAA granted states the 
universal jurisdiction needed to bring violent criminals to justice. While US law dictates 
permissible instances of forceful intervention, the Law of War regulates the scope of the US’s 
attack and mandates all nations to use the “principle of proportionality.” The principle holds that 
an intervening state “must not cause incidental loss of civilian life or destruction of civilian objects 
that is out of proportion to the direct and concrete military advantage.” Although the expansion of 
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US law served as a crucial step towards lawful intervention, international law still forbids its 
member states from using force or threatening another nation, except for certain exceptions that 
still remain highly contentious within the international community. The Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) is reflected in Article 2(7)’s use of force exception that enables states to “use armed 
force to preserve or restore international peace and security” on the condition that Article 
41’s measures of diplomatic relations and economic sanctions prove ineffective. Accordingly, the 
Charter stipulates that when a state must intervene, “plans for the application of armed force must 
be made with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.” The UNSC’s coordination with the 
Military Staff Committee is a laborious process, and often hinders a state’s ability to act efficiently. 
Ultimately, all international treaties, conventions, and declarations are motivated by the same 
overarching goal: maintaining global peace and security. Nevertheless, the path to maintaining this 
security, especially during instances of grave humanitarian abuse, is not a simple one. Both 
the Responsibility to Protect and Article 2(7) of the UN Charter aim to provide guidance to 
concerned nations seeking to defend the abused. Although the Charter grants states the right to 
intervene on behalf of international security, the use of force must be self-defense in response to 
imminent acts of aggression. The assassination of a brutal leader as a form of “anticipatory self-
defense” is only permitted where the death “may actually prevent a nuclear or biological or other 
highly destructive form of warfare.” 
In the past two decades, the US has led forceful humanitarian interventions, bypassing the proper 
legal channels and carrying out attacks under the claim of preventing widespread violence. 
Working with local rebel forces, the US invaded and subsequently killed two tyrannical 
leaders: Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. In both instances, the US 
asserted R2P and acted without proper UNSC authorization in violation of international law. 
Although the US evaded punishment both times, the lack of repercussions was no indication of the 
legality. Further, while the past invasions were illegally implemented, provisions do exist which 
permit assassination and aggression as lawful means of enforcement. While exceptions to the use 
of force may be limited, international law allows for states to forcefully “take down” an abusive 
dictator when necessary. 
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Is Operation Sovereign Borders Running 
Afoul of Australia’s Refugee Commitments? 
November 15, 2017 
by Chris Rennie 
Australia has one of the strictest refugee policies in the world. Although it is party to 
the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the Australian government pursued 
immigration policies throughout the last fifteen years that many international human rights lawyers 
consider violations of the Convention’s refugee asylum requirements. The terms of the Convention 
are clear: “no one shall expel or return a refugee against his or her will…to a territory where he or 
she fears threats to life or freedom.” Government reforms implemented to deter seaborne asylum 
seekers, however, have potentially done just that by authorizing the Australian Border Force 
to intercept boats carrying refugees and return them back to transit states like Indonesia and Sri 
Lanka. 
The Australian government’s position is that the policies, known collectively as Operation 
Sovereign Borders, exist to combat illegal immigration. In the year before the program was 
instituted, 20,000 irregular migrants attempted to reach Australia by sea. In 2014, a year later, that 
number dropped to 161. Proponents of the program argue that the program’s success prevents 
deaths at sea and combats the mercenary trade of people smuggling. International law experts, 
however, note that the “how, where, when, and why boats are being pushed back” is unknown–the 
Australian government, citing national security concerns, will not disclose the details of the 
operation. 
From a legal perspective, the details make all the difference. Migrants who assert formal claims 
for asylum become eligible for refugee status. Refugees have special rights, and the legality of 
Australia’s Operation Sovereign Border hinges on whether its maritime operations violate one of 
the most essential afforded to them: the right to non-refoulement. Migrants are only entitled to 
non-refoulement – the right that protects them from indiscriminate expulsion –after pleading 
asylum, which begs the question: is the Australian government denying migrants due process when 
its Border Force turns boats of migrants away before they ever reach Australian shores? 
The answer to that question depends on where and how the Border Force operates. Interceptions 
that take place on the high sea, beyond Australian territorial waters, may not require the Australian 
government to exercise jurisdiction. This is the Australian government’s stance, as well as their 
defense against claims that the Border Force is violating Australia’s commitment to the 
Convention. Simply put, the government feels it has no asylum obligations where it does not 
exercise sovereign control. This is a tricky position, as Article 8 of the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts defines the conduct of state agents 
acting under the direction of a state to be an act of the state itself. If agents of the Border Force 
are taking control of boats, they could be exercising Australian jurisdiction and should therefore 
initiate immigration proceedings for any migrant who claims asylum. 
International Coverage Fall 2017 
 4 
Unfortunately, the Australian government’s lack of transparency makes it almost impossible to 
determine whether the activities of the Border Force are in violation of Australia’s international 
commitments. Even if more documentation existed, it would still be difficult to predict how the 
international community could hold the Australian government accountable. The Articles on the 
Responsibility of States is only a recommendation from the UN’s International Law Commission, 
and high courts in other parts of the world have split decisions on the limits of non-refoulement. 
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court issued a verdict 
upholding an Executive Order to indiscriminately return all Haitian migrants intercepted on the 
high seas back to Haiti. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights challenged this holding 
in Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, which found that state agents intercepting 
vessels at high sea extended state jurisdiction over those they detained. Concordant with Haitian 
Centre, the European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy rejected Italy’s 
claim that it did not exercise jurisdiction in intercepting migrants at high sea before returning them 
to Libya, holding that Italy violated its duty to initiate asylum proceedings under the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, even though the intercepted claimants only made 
informal pleas. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is even less equivocal, 
stating “the principle of non-refoulement does not imply any geographic limitation.” 
While Australia’s reputation as a defender of global human rights is subject to international 
scrutiny, its current government, however, is not accountable to any legal authority but its own. 
Barring diplomatic pressure, the legality of Operation Sovereign Borders will remain in question 
until it is challenged, perhaps by a migrant in an Australian court, or, albeit less likely, through a 
claim filed at the International Court of Justice by a transit nation like Indonesia, which has 
been critical of the Australian solution. 
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In the Wake of the 2014 Crimea Takeover, 
Russia is Persecuting the Tatars 
November 16, 2017 
by Matthew Bienstock 
Despite continuing international criticism of Russia’s 2014 takeover of Crimea, the Russian 
government has intensified its offense against those who seek Crimea’s reunification with 
Ukraine. Tatars, who make up more than ten percent of the Crimean population, oppose the 
Russian annexation and have been the target of systemic human rights violations, 
including searches, arrests, sham trials, and detention. Most Crimean Tatars are Muslims, and they 
perceive the persecution to be both religious and political. Russia has imposed the legal 
framework of the Russian Federation on Crimea and has used its criminal code to intimidate, 
harass, and silence dissent. However, the imposition of Russian Federation law on Crimea should 
also carry with it the responsibility of the occupying authorities to follow international 
humanitarian law to which it is obligated. 
In February 2014, Russian armed forces seized control of and occupied Crimea and a month later, 
after a sham referendum that violated the Ukrainian constitution, announced that Crimea had 
become part of the Russian Federation. A month later, the UN General Assembly affirmed that 
Crimea was part of the Ukraine.  Nonetheless, Russia continued religious and political intimidation 
of Crimean citizens who opposed its occupation. The Russian occupying authorities ordered all 
religious groups to register with the Russian government by January 1, 2016, or face losing their 
legal status. The authorities raided mosques, confiscated literature they deemed “extremist,” and 
subjected the leadership of Crimean Muslim Tatars to surveillance and intimidation. 
In January 2015, Russia’s Supreme Court convicted four Tatars of being members of Hizb ut-
Tahrir, an Islamic group banned in Russia. Russia forcibly transferred the men out of Crimea to a 
North Caucasus district military court for their trials, in violation of their right to a fair trial. One 
of the four men, Ruslan Zeytullaev, is on a hunger strike to protest the false accusations of 
terrorism. In January 2015, Russian authorities arrested Akhtem Chiygoz, deputy leader of the 
Crimean Mejlis legislature and a vocal critic of the annexation, by applying the Criminal Code of 
the Russian Federation retroactively to events which predated the occupation. Chiygoz spent 
fifteen months in pre-trial detention before a thirteen month long sham trial on charges 
of organizing mass disturbances. In May 2016, Russian authorities banned the Mejlis and 
prohibited all the group’s activities claiming it was an extremist organization. In June 2016, 
Russian authorities arrested Ilmi Umerov, deputy chairman of the now-illegal Mejlis, on charges 
of separatism after he made public statements opposing the annexation. These are not one-off 
incidents. The U.S. State Department 2016 Human Rights Report on Crimea details the 
widespread campaign of the Russian authorities to deprive ethnic Crimean Tatars of fundamental 
civil liberties and to subject them to systematic discrimination. These are clear violations of human 
rights protected under long-standing international treaties. 
Russia is a party and legally obligated to three key international treaties that have codified human 
rights:  1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); 1966 International Covenant on 
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ECHR specifically protects the rights to freedom of expression, 
religion, and fair trial. The ICCPR obligates its parties to respect the civil and political rights of 
individuals, including the right to freedom of speech, religion, assembly, due process, and a fair 
trial. The ICESCR includes the right of all people to non-discrimination based on religion, politics, 
national, or social origin. 
All three treaties permit human rights restrictions for interests of national security. By using this 
pretext, Russia has persisted in subjugating the Tatars and repressing those who oppose 
annexation, despite protests from the U.S. Department of State.  In 1997 the Ukraine ratified 
the ECHR, thus allowing the Ukraine to bring its case before the European Court of Human Rights. 
In March 2014, the Court called upon both Russia and Ukraine to refrain from 
taking measures including military action that might violate civilian rights, and this interim 
measure remains in effect until the case is heard. Normally it takes years for the Court to hear 
cases, and interim measures indicate that the Court understood the urgency of remediation. While 
non-compliance with interim measures is a breach of the Convention, until the Court acts, it 
remains unclear if Russia will be held accountable for human rights violations in Crimea. 
 
